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Review  
The mind-body problem; three equations 
and one solution represented by 
immaterial-material data 
 Ion G. Motofei1* and David L. Rowland2 
 1Carol Davila University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Faculty of General Medicine, Bucharest, Romania 
2Valparaiso University, Department of Psychology, Valparaiso, Indiana, USA 
  
Abstract Human life occurs within a complex bio-psycho-social milieu, a heterogeneous system that is 
integrated by multiple bidirectional interrelations existing between the abstract-intangible ideas 
and physical-chemical support of environment. The mind is thus placed between the abstract 
ideas/ concepts and neurobiological brain that is further connected to environment. In other 
words, the mind acts as an interface between the immaterial (abstract/ intangible) data and 
material (biological) support. The science is unable to conceives and explains an interaction 
between the immaterial and material domains (to understand nature of the mind), this question 
generating in literature the mind-body problem.  
We have published in the past a succession of articles related to the mind-body problem, in 
order to demonstrate the fact that this question is actually a false issue. The phenomenon of 
immaterial-material interaction is impossible to be explained because it never occurs, which 
means that there is no need to explain the immaterial-material interaction. Our mind implies only 
a temporal association between the immaterial data and material support, this dynamic 
interrelation being presented and argued here as a solution to the mind-body problem.        
The limited psycho-biologic approach of the mind-body problem is expanded here to a more 
comprehensive and feasible bio-psycho-social perspective, generating thus three distinct (bio-
psychological, bio-social, and psycho-social) equations. These three equations can be solved 
through a solution represented by a dynamic cerebral system (two distinct and interconnected 
subunits of the brain) which presumably could have the capability of receiving and processing 
abstract data through association (with no interaction) between immaterial and material data.   
  
Keywords  mind-body problem, three equations, one solution, immaterial-material data, bio-
psychological, bio-social, psycho-social, internal mental interaction       
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Highlights ✓ Interaction between immaterial data and material brain is not possible, the mind body 
problem referring rather to procession of immaterial data by our material brain.   
✓ Procession of abstract data by our brain is possible through association between 
immaterial data and material/nervous impulses of the brain, interface of this association 
being represented by time          
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Introduction 
The mind governs to a great extent both one’s 
physical existence and psycho-social life, having a 
psychological self/ identity that is distinct from the 
physical body, and a conscious reality (colors, sounds, 
etc.) that differs from the surrounding physical and 
chemical external reality (electromagnetic waves, air 
vibration, chemical compounds, etc.)  (1, 2).  
Beyond the individual psychological existence, a 
society is based on the persistent social participation and 
interaction of its individual members, thus affords to its 
members benefits that would not otherwise be possible. 
Such benefits can be in the form of individual and/ or 
common benefits, and refer to various (abstract or 
concrete) kinds of advantages that result from social 
exchanges (e.g., learning, cultural traditions, playing 
games like chess, etc.). A society is thus characterized 
by patterns of relationships (in the form of social 
relations) between individuals who share a distinctive 
culture and personality. Accordingly, a given society 
can be described as the sum of the existing relationships 
of its constituent members. A large society may exhibit 
stratification or dominance patterns among subgroups, 
which usually become evident during mental 
interactions among its members (3, 4). 
Thus, the individual is part of the society, governed 
by its norms and values, but who at the same time must 
integrate within the larger prevailing social system. If 
the individual contributes to societal goals, that society 
in turn contributes to the individual’s mental 
development. In support of this idea, social medium, for 
example, is critical for evolution and development of the 
mind, either through a positive involvement in education 
and learning or, alternatively, by limiting/ 
counterproductive factors (social restrictions, social 
competition and exclusion, irrational mentalities, etc.). 
Human beings are therefore complex bio-psycho-
social entities that represent the end-product of 
interactions among biological (genetic, neural, 
biochemical, etc), psychological (personality, mood, 
behaviour, etc.) and sociocultural (school, 
socioeconomic tasks, cultural medium, religious norms/ 
beliefs, etc.) factors (5). 
Contrary to this integrated bio-psycho-social 
perspective, literature data is still dissociated by 
restricted interpretations and results. For example, the 
psychological identity is presented in a didactic way in 
relation with self-image (the view you have of yourself), 
self-esteem (how much value you place on yourself), 
and individuality. It is unclear to what extent the self-
components would be supported by the brain, or they 
would be in fact just analytical interpretation/ products 
of the mind (6). At opposite end, mental impairments 
like autism or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
would result (according to imagistic studies) due to 
functional disruption of several brain networks (7-9).  
As a consequence, it would be insufficient to study 
mental entities and events from restricted (either 
psychological or biological) perspectives. For this 
reason, there are papers presenting new psycho-
physiologic approaches, with psychological phenomena 
(such as internal mental interaction) resulting from 
cerebral interaction between distinct subunits of the 
brain. In this paper, we elaborate upon this concept of 
internal mental interaction from a unified bio-psycho-
social perspective for humans, a conceptualization 
which might further represent a solution to the mind-
body problem. 
 
Discussion 
From a physiologic perspective, environmental 
interaction (between external stimuli and the body) ends 
at the level of primary somatosensory cortex. According 
to indirect realism, data from primary somatosensory 
cortex is further projected within the brain (to secondary 
somatosensory cortex) creating a veritable internal-
mental copy of the environment (10). Recent papers 
sustain that concepts like indirect realism, the self and 
identity should be revised, not only in respect to the level 
of organization and deployment (psychological versus 
bio-phycho-social), but also regarding the role and 
interrelations of the respective entities and events (11).     
Thus, a relatively new theory sustains that the mind 
would be comprised of two distinct and complementary 
subunits of the brain, represented by “internal mental 
existence” and “internal mental reality”, interacting with 
one another in the form of “internal mental interaction” 
(Figure 1). As a consequence, entire environmental 
interaction would be actually projected and reproduced 
within the brain, environmental stimuli being projected 
as internal mental reality (supported by the somatic 
nervous system) while the body would be projected as 
internal mental existence (supported by autonomic 
nervous system). Accordingly, internal mental existence 
and internal mental reality would be supported by 
specific/ dedicated neurological structures of the brain, 
which transmit mental data from one to the other (12).     
From a functional point of view, the deployment of 
internal mental interaction would be independently by 
environmental interaction, these two/ parallel 
interactions being interconnected just informationally. 
This functional disconnection would be able to explain 
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the autonomy of the mind in respect to environment 
(focusing attention on internal ideas/ representations 
while ignoring external stimuli, dreams, imagination, 
etc.), the fact that the mind works with internal stimuli 
and elaborates internal responses (without a mandatory 
externalization), and some pathological situations like 
autism spectrum disorder.    
Corresponding to the physical body, internal mental 
existence possesses on one hand the attentional focus to 
receive afferents (inputs), and on the other the decision-
making process to elaborate responses (to release 
outputs). The appurtenance of decision making 
processes and attentional focus to the same neuro-
informational entity of the brain (internal mental 
existence) is able to explain the close connection 
existing between these two processes. Sometimes our 
decisions originate from our attentional focus, while 
other times we first decide what to do and subsequently 
direct our attentional focus towards objects/ people that 
support the performing of the established target/ desire. 
But, in handling abstract data, our autonomic system 
supporting internal mental existence is not able to 
interact with classical neurophysiological processes of 
the brain. As a consequence, both attentional focus and 
decision-making processes imply intervention of a 
specific interface (internal mental reality), to ensure 
conversion of information between the mental (abstract) 
format and the neurophysiologic format (of the body), 
conversion that represents the core subject of the mind-
body problem (11).  
Literature conceptualization on this topic focuses 
on two distinct notions: indirect realism and the 
psychology of self. Indirect realism is viewed as an 
internal projection of external data (10), while 
psychology of self discusses about the self as “I” (the 
subjective knower) and also the self as “Me” (the object 
that is known) (13). According to our interpretation, the 
old concept of internal mental representation should be 
extended to a larger approach like internal mental 
reality, because it is dual performing not only inputs but 
also outputs. The old concept of self should be also 
revised, the self as “I” corresponding to a real 
neurologic-informational existence (internal mental 
existence), while the self as “Me” would correspond to 
circulating mental data that is related to our own 
conscious representation (mental identity). 
 
1. Psychological existence and the corresponding 
cerebral support; internal mental existence 
Although the mind incorporates an abstract 
dimension, it has good connection and control over the 
physical body. Thus, the mind is able to focus attention 
on external physical stimuli (facilitating their entry to 
the conscious domain through peripheral receptors) or 
can elaborate (through conscious and voluntary decision 
making) and transmit to the brain/ skeletal muscles 
unlimited abstract motor responses. Such abstract 
efferents are represented by gestures, motor 
participation of the hands to support abstract verbal 
explanations (e.g., arranging in virtual-imaginative 
space abstract entities, like a company and interrelated 
profit and loss), dances in different styles, and so  
on (1, 14, 15).       
In turn, the human body sustains the mind directly 
through cerebral activation and response and indirectly 
through supporting physiological (metabolic, endocrine, 
respiratory, circulatory) mechanisms. As an example, 
mental existence ceases when the neurophysiological 
processing of the brain is interrupted through procedures 
such as hypnosis or general anesthesia, and when the 
brain is damaged or the physical body dies (16, 17). 
Moreover, intensive abstract exercises can tire the mind, 
with increased need for sleep after a period of intense 
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mental concentration/ activity (18). Yet, studies using 
fMRI have shown a direct connection between some 
psychological performances (attention, concentration, 
analytical analyze, etc.) and specific cerebral areas. 
Several drugs acting within the brain keep us awake 
(caffeine), and/ or improve our attentional focus 
(atomoxetine) and mental power (19, 20).  
Even if there is a close connection between the mind 
and physical body, the mind implies a specific 
(intrinsic/autonomic) presence, which was described not 
only during attention-demanding tasks but also when an 
individual is awake and at rest (wakeful rest). Attention-
demanding tasks seem to be supported by task positive 
network of the brain, while mental presence during 
wakeful rest appears to be sustained by default mode 
network of the brain (7, 8). The psychological presence 
(as psychological event) and the corresponding 
neurological support generate together internal mental 
existence, which is different by the physical existence of 
the body so that it can be compatible with analytical 
attention and decisions (Figure 2).  
In support of internal mental existence, our mind is 
 
able for example to disconnect from environmental/ 
social data (ignoring external physical stimuli) and focus 
attention on internal abstract ideas, impressions and 
cogitations (using memory, imagination, thinking, etc.) 
(1). Due to this autonomous and analytical functioning, 
long-term abstract preoccupations (improvement of 
one’s reputation, developmental professional strategies, 
etc.) are sometimes more important for decision making 
process than the short-term concrete needs of the 
physiological body (eating, sleeping, etc.). Such 
developmental strategies/ desires (generally abstract in 
nature) are often hidden within our minds from other 
members of society (who can oppose them, due to a real 
competition on food, houses, jobs, privileges, etc.), 
having thus a strong personal character (21, 22).         
As a conclusion, the mind implies a well delineated 
psychological existence, which are supported by the 
brain but functionally disconnected (at least in part) 
from the physiological-environmental existence. In 
psychological and biological terms, the first (psycho-
biologic) equation of the mind-body problem is as below 
(see Figure 1):     
 
1. Mental Entity + Body = Individual / personalized Mental Existence 
2. Conscious representation of social data in the form 
of mental reality 
 The mind occupies a position “over” the individual 
(physical and psychological) existence, due to the fact 
that it is able to establish connections not only with the 
physical body but also with abstract-intangible data 
(playing chess for example, abstract conversations to 
math lessons, etc). For this reason conscious 
representations extend beyond the individual existence, 
preoccupations like learning, exploration and 
documentation implying a strong social-relational 
participation (23). The exchange of abstract ideas 
between individuals (e.g., through verbal and written 
communication) is an essential process for acquiring 
knowledge and for subsequent cognition (24). 
Accordingly, mental reality overlaps to a great extent 
with the surrounding social-relational medium, a 
proposition that can explain not only the extension of the 
mental reality beyond the physical body, but also the 
mind’s capacity for awareness of social events and data 
(Figure 2).               
 Based on such mental interactions among 
individuals, social psychology studies the influences 
exercised by some individuals on the thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviors of others (25). Such interpersonal 
influences induce specific mental phenomena and 
experiences like attitude, persuasion, social/ political 
influences, social cognition, etc. From a physiological 
perspective, the environment represents an external 
medium for the biological body; from the perspective of 
social psychology, the surrounding social medium is an 
intrinsic part of our mind, in the form of mental (psycho-
social) reality (26).   
 This mental (psycho-social) reality is placed to 
disposition/ discretion of our mind for cognition, which 
is able to voluntarily scan the entire conscious reality 
(abstract job tasks, the arrangement of environmental 
objects, the requests of social partners, etc.) through 
one’s attentional focus, selecting through decision 
making processes a certain element or task to be studied/ 
performed while ignoring the others. In this way, 
abstract social tasks sometimes take higher precedence 
in the mind than specific individual needs and pleasures 
(27). Mental reality/ representation incorporates 
therefore not only individual mental elements 
(perceptions, feelings, beliefs, identity, etc.) but also a 
social-relational dimension (often abstract/ 
informational in nature), being entirely realized and 
processed by our mind. In psychological and social 
terms, the second (psycho-social) equation of the mind-
body problem would be as below (see Figure 2): 
 
2. Mental Identity + Abstract Social Data = Psycho-Social Reality    
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3. Bio-social transmission of abstract social data 
Social interaction within social systems implies 
usually two (or more) individuals exchanging abstract 
and concrete data between them. Thus, two separate 
individuals are able to transmit abstract ideas between 
them, resorting usually to language to communicate (28, 
29). On one hand, environmental social data are 
abstract-immaterial, so that such data are unable to 
interact with the physical-material body and brain. On 
the other hand, transmission of abstract data between 
two individuals clearly occurs, being possible through 
somatic peripheral effectors (mouth) and receptors 
(ears) of the body. Such transmission of abstract-
immaterial data between two physical bodies is possible 
through the annexation of abstract data to external 
physical stimuli, the latter being able to interact with 
physical receptors of the body (1, 30).  
Thus, abstract data is transmitted between two 
distinct persons (physical bodies) via a physical 
environmental stimulus, which is capable of encoding 
an abstract message. For example, a sound is a physical 
stimulus (received by ears) which can encode (in the 
form of a word) an abstract message (`come`). Light is 
another physical stimulus (received by eyes) that can 
encode (in the form of Morse code) the same abstract 
message (`come`). Signs, gestures, and written language 
are also received by eyes as visual stimuli, yet all these 
stimuli can encode the same abstract message (`come`). 
These examples indicate that an abstract/ immaterial 
message can be attached to a physical stimulus, yet are 
separate from the material properties of the respective 
physical stimulus (you can say `come` aloud, or slowly, 
or with certain tonal qualities: inviting vs demanding) 
(31, 32).  
As a conclusion, abstract social data are immaterial 
messages that are never self-standing, so that it must be 
attached to external physical stimuli. Three distinct 
remarks are warranted here. 
The first observation is that the described 
attachment of abstract data to material stimuli makes 
sense only when it is transmitted between two distinct 
entities (because it incorporates a message), and when 
the two entities use the same encoding-decoding 
procedure/ language (the receiver person must be able to 
extract the abstract message carried by the physical 
stimulus. As an example, while one person might 
understand the meaning of a certain word in his/her 
native language, another who does not know that 
language would not understand the message (the word 
has no significance) (12, 22). 
The second is that the attachment of abstract data to 
a physical stimulus is a dynamic association, established 
between an abstract message and succession in time of 
several physical stimuli (light signals for Morse code, 
letters in words, etc.). This dynamic association is 
therefore possible through time, which is related to both 
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physical matter (being physically measurable) and to 
abstract data (which is non-material) (1). Abstract 
immaterial data can therefore be associated in dynamics 
(in time) with several successive physical stimuli, but 
with no direct connection or interaction with the 
physical stimuli because abstract immaterial data and 
physical stimuli are distinct in nature. 
The third remark is that abstract-immaterial data are 
associated in time with physical stimuli, so that abstract-
immaterial data and properties of physical stimuli  
(as material data) can be associated/ interrelated (which 
does not mean they interact), generating together 
through emergentism a new entity, in the form of 
immaterial-material data.  
Immaterial-material information should, therefore, 
be able to exhibit new properties, which would have no 
meaning in a limited bio-social approach, because these 
new properties should emerge over/ above the level of 
material-immaterial organization and interpretation (1) 
(Figure 3).    
 
 
 As an example, in a psychological interpretation, 
when intensity of the sound adds to an abstract message, 
the resulted material-immaterial information exhibits 
mental properties which can be received by a person/ 
mind in the form of emotional messages like anger (e.g., 
when saying `go` screaming), endearing/ affectionate 
(when saying `come` whispering/ delicate), etc (33). 
Being compatible with our mind, the material-
immaterial information (supported by physical stimuli) 
is therefore mental in nature. In turn, the mind should 
present a similar organization, consisting of a physical 
support (the brain) and the corresponding material-
immaterial information, a supra-physiologic system that 
emerges over the level of material-immaterial 
representation and interpretation (1, 34).  
In biological and abstract-social terms, the third 
(bio-social) equation of the mind-body problem would 
be:
 
3. Physical stimuli + Abstract-Social Data = Social interaction = Transfer of abstract data between two  
                                                                                                  physical bodies/ entities 
4. A bio-psycho-social integration         
The three perspectives presented above (psycho-
biologic, psycho-social and bio-social) must merge into 
a unitary bio-psycho-social model, with such a unified 
model being specific for humans (35). In support of this, 
we are for example conscious about psycho-social 
reality not only during interaction with social medium 
(as a result of social activity), but also at the individual 
level (as a result of cerebral activity). Thus, the 
conscious social reality can be contemplated/ studied by 
an individual through imagination, memory, or 
dreaming (36, 37).  
To arrive at this unitary model, it is necessary to 
transfer and implement inside of a single brain the 
psycho-social reality, due to three important reasons: a) 
we are aware of the psycho-social reality, b) conscious 
reality has a strong individual appurtenance, and c) 
social cognition/ abstract events are strongly related to 
specific cerebral areas of the brain (3, 12, 24, 26, 27, 30). 
In this way it is actually generated a personal/individual 
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and supra-physiologic (material-immaterial) mental 
reality, closely related to the individual mental state 
described by commonsense psychology. Being 
individualized, a person can resort to his/her own mental 
state and experience to explain and predict the behaviors 
and mental states of other people in a wide range of 
circumstances. Being supra-physiologic, the mental 
state is able to explain specific mental processes (like 
pain, pleasure, excitement, anxiety, envy, pride, 
empathy, etc) and, in addition, to interact with abstract/ 
mental data (38, 39).        
The most feasible way to transfer/ create a 
conscious social reality within a single brain is to copy 
the entire social model within the respective brain. 
According to the social model, abstract social reality is 
an incontestable event and results from two distinct 
persons exchanging abstract messages between them. In 
a similar way, two distinct neuronal subunits of a brain 
(internal mental reality and existence) should be capable 
of exchanging abstract messages (or, more precisely, 
material-immaterial information) between them, 
creating/ supporting within the respective brain a supra-
physiologic internal mental interaction (1, 40).  
This assumption of a “dual” brain can be verified 
resorting to the three equations of the mind-body 
problem.        
 
 
Mind = Individual Mental Existence   +          Psycho-Social Reality     
Mind = Mental Entity + Body          + Mental Identity + Abstract Social Data  
Mind = Mental Entity + Mental Identity + Physical support + Abstract Social Data     
Mind = Conscious Existence and Representation   + Transfer of abstract data between two 
physical entities (subunits of the brain) 
 
From a physiological perspective, the two distinct 
neuronal subunits of the brain could be represented by 
somatic and autonomic nervous sub-systems. The 
somatic nervous system (SNS) ensures the relational 
connection of the body with the external medium (a 
physical/ chemical reality: electromagnetic waves, 
acids, bases, etc.), which is projected within the brain as 
an internal mental reality (colours, tastes, smells, etc.). 
The autonomic nervous system (ANS) would support 
the mental entity, which analytically processes mental 
data received (through attentional focus) from the 
internal mental reality.  
The involvement of the ANS in the construction of 
the mind could explain the mind’s capacity to work with 
internal stimuli instead of external stimuli (e.g., colours, 
sounds exist only in our mind), to elaborate internal 
responses (with no mandatory external transmission), 
and to support environmentally-independent 
autonomous functioning (imagination, dreams, etc.) 
(40-42). This autonomous functioning could explain an 
individual’s mental capacity to disconnect attention 
from environmental/ social data (ignoring external 
physical stimuli) in favor of internal abstract ideas/ 
impressions (cogitation). 
5. Consciousness within a supra-physiologic 
interpretation 
When the mind processes any kind of (abstract or 
concrete) data, the physiological mechanisms 
supporting procession are the same, but the responses 
are different according to the type of information that is 
processed. The mind is therefore able to access and 
process distinct information in distinct sessions 
(mathematics, cultural, related to its own self, etc.), 
somewhat similar to a computer that can run (on the 
same hardware support) distinct software applications in 
distinct sessions (as seen in computational 
neurosciences). Such mental processing can be 
performed individually, or in the form of social 
communication and learning (43, 44).  
The SNS ensures the relational connection of the 
body with external medium and internal mental reality, 
while the ANS supports mental entity/decision and 
attentional focus. But the mental data are dynamic 
(material-immaterial data must be circulated bi-
directionally), and the mind has a consciousness. To 
explain these characteristics, it has been suggested that 
the ANS receives nervous impulses from the SNS, 
ensures processing of the information received/ 
associated in an analytical manner, and the results are 
sent back towards the SNS. The process described 
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continues indefinitely (with the same or other data), 
resulting in a bidirectional and continuous circuit for 
mental data, which must flow/ be dynamic (1, 45, 46) 
(Figure 1).  
In psychological terms, our mental presence is able 
to select and receive (through voluntary attentional 
focus) data from the internal mental reality, to consider 
it in an analytical manner, and return the outcome 
(involuntarily) back to the internal mental reality. This 
circuit resumes so that the individual is notified through 
attentional focus about the action (decision making 
process), about a specific object (that was taken into 
consideration), or about our mental entity (as a subject 
of our attention). This is the consciousness (qualia)—the 
state/ quality that enables the “somebody” (ANS) to be 
aware (informed) of the “something” (SNS)—within a 
continuous feed-back loop that keeps us conscious and 
awake (1). Even if the circulating data are similar along 
the two directions, only the direction from internal 
mental reality/ something (the SNS) towards mental 
identity (ANS) represents consciousness, as attentional 
focus. The opposite direction does not engender 
consciousness, due to the fact that the “something” can’t 
be aware about the “somebody” (1, 22).     
The mind has thus a conscious domain and an 
unconscious part. Physiologically, for example, the 
body is unable to ingest external visual stimuli, because 
external stimuli belong to the environment. An 
electromagnetic field (the physical format of external 
visual stimulus), for example, terminates at the level/ 
contact with cone cells of the eye. From this point 
forward, the qualitative and quantitative properties of 
the external visual stimulus are transformed in a 
physiologic format (nervous impulse) and transmitted to 
the primary somatosensory cortex. Thus, the primary 
somatosensory cortex has no access to the external 
(physical/ chemical) format of environmental 
information (45). In a similar way, our mind has no 
access to the physiologic format of information, because 
the mind is organized above this level of representation. 
In other words, attentional focus is unable to identify the 
neurological support of the surrounding internal mental 
reality (our mental existence is unable to be conscious 
about neurological component of the mind), because the 
mind and consciousness emerges at a supra-physiologic 
level. It is a consequence of the fact that internal mental 
existence is designed to only receive specific data (in a 
mental format) from internal mental reality (1, 46).  
Conclusions 
The mind-body problem refers to the existing 
interrelation between the abstract mind and the material 
body. This paper continues a series of articles on this 
topic, suggesting that the physical matter (body and 
brain) is not able to interact with abstract data, but can 
however receive and process such abstract data. 
Transmission of abstract data to a person is possible 
through association between immaterial and material 
data, an association that is performed in time and as a 
dynamic attachment (1). Even an ordinary word for 
example encodes abstract data through several letters/ 
sounds produced over time.    
The abstract dimension of the mind is a dynamic 
process within the brain even during sleep, and thus is 
able to explain the occurrence of dreams. When this 
dynamic process is terminated (for example, a cerebral 
hypoxia, for only 4-8 minutes), the abstract dimension 
of the mind ceases permanently. In such a case the brain 
may still be able to produce an arousal state, but one 
without awareness (consciousness and mental identity 
are permanently lost, or severe impaired), a condition 
described in the literature as persistent vegetative state 
(47).       
Finally, the mind is not a simple neuro-
informational entity. Rather, it is a system composed of 
two distinct and interconnected neuro-informational 
entities, using the same language for encoding-decoding 
data. The consequence of data transfer (between SNS 
and ANS) is not a summing effect of the two neuro-
informational entities, because these two structures 
(having distinct/ complementary roles) present actually 
synergistic actions (and have no sense if one is isolated/ 
studied separately from the other) (1). While some 
cerebral structures support internal mental reality 
(colors for example), other structures are involved in 
experiential sense of self (continuity of 'I' experience), 
according to imagistic studies (21, 47, 48). Accordingly, 
the SNS and ANS together create through emergentism 
a complex neuro-informational entity which is able to 
support a dynamic processing and representation of 
mental substance (as immaterial-material nature) of the 
mind (1, 40). New studies will be necessary to further 
develop the concept of immaterial-material association, 
as previously described through fMRI studies (for 
example, for visuo-haptic convergence) (49, 50), or to 
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explain multiple interrelations existing between the 
mind, autonomic nervous system and sexuality (51-53).    
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